There has been much discussion over what is the immediate future of the war on terror. There is general consensus on what nations are "on the list" - Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran and North Korea. Which should be next leads to significant divergence of opinion. Some have argued that we should go for the biggest threat, regardless of the difficulties - or even that we should take on the strongest target first. Others argue that we should pick off the weakest and work our way up.
So far in the War on Terror, we have chosen two targets. In many respects, both were low hanging fruit. In fact, looked at one way, every nation on our list is low hanging fruit with the possible exception of North Korea. In the comments to this excellent Trent Telenko post, Iblis likens the War on Terror to the Island hopping strategy in WWII, and then draws the wrong conclusions from his analogy.
He is wrong in suggesting that we should go immediately for the most difficult target. We did not go straight for Japan in WWII. That was the whole point of the Island hopping campaign. Just as in pool, each shot should leave you in a better position for your next shot. Afghanistan was our first shot, and helped us by putting an immediate hurt on Al Qaida, and reducing the chances of further attacks on US soil in the near term. Aside from the fact that Iraq was a sure win militarily, there are more important reasons why Iraq was next on the list.
I argued here a while back that the primary reasons that Iraq was chosen was because a) it was easiest and b) its central location would allow us to put pressure on so many other nations on our list. It would allow us to pursue an interior lines strategy, even though it is thousands of miles from home. (Also, the diplomatic situation made Iraq an easy target, due to the numerous and flagrant violations of UN resolutions.) While we can use that position to execute a flypaper strategy, that is merely a situational tactic; useful but not moving us dramatically forward.
When we think about our next target, North Korea is wrong for several reasons. First, how do we get the South Koreans to sign on for an invasion of the North? What possible benefit is there for them? The risks far outweigh the potential gains. The damage to their people, their economy and infrastructure could be very large, even in a quick allied victory. Second, (this follows from the first) without the support of the South, invading North Korea would be painful for us, considering the degree to which our military is overstretched. Third, our position in Iraq and Afghanistan gives us no leverage or advantage in North Korea. Fourth, there is the risk that they already have nuclear weapons. And fifth, considering how messed up the North is, if we can arrange a total embargo of food and fuel, it could collapse all by itself in the very near future. As I mentioned here, if the regime collapses, it could very well implode quietly, which would allow the South Koreans and us to move in and pick up the pieces.
There are three remaining targets on the list - Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia. As Trent Telenko mentioned in an post on Winds of Change, the game against Saudi Arabia may have already begun. However, I don't think we will move openly too soon, if only because of Saudi Arabia's special place in the Islamic world. Other cautions include the fact that while we have been building up our strategic reserves of petroleum, and increasing the production in Iraq, neither of these processes have moved far enough to give us enough security from the Saudis gaming the international oil markets; and we don't have a direct casus beli.
Further, I don't think our next moves will involve direct military action, at least not on a large scale. It should be obvious by now that we are overstretched militarily, and committing to another invasion and occupation (at least before the North Korean situation is resolved) could be foolhardy. Or else we need to call up the National Guard in a big way.
Of the next two targets, Iran is clearly a larger threat to us, even if Syria might equal them in general terror sponsorship. Syria seems to have toned down its activities somewhat since the Iraq invasion, and does not seem to be actively trying to get nukes. Syria is the lesser threat, and while it would be easy in abstract terms to take it out, we simply don't have the available troops, especially for occupation duty.
Iran offers the most possibilities by far. There is an active resistance/revolutionary movement, which we could encourage, supply and support. With some help from us, we could possibly give the Mullahcracy the nudge it needs to go over the cliff into the dustbin of history. The regime seems nervous and unstable, and perhaps some clever psyops and "hearts and minds" type activities could reap great benefits. Targeted strikes on nuclear and other WMD facilities by Air and Special Forces could help contain the WMD threat during the chaos of the collapse. Similar strikes on regime targets could significantly aid the democracy movement in coming to power with less bloodshed. It seems to me that we can gain the most with the least effort by focusing our efforts on Iran.
The end of the Iranian government would make our occupation of Iraq easier, and would of course be of immeasurable benefit for the Iranians. A democratic Iran would create a broad swath of contiguous territory that is all Muslim, and all democratic. This would be a remarkable achievement, and one we should bend all our efforts toward.
[Side notes:] There are situations where I can foresee combat against Syria or North Korea. Both involve stupendous blunders on the part of their respective dictators. If either of these nations decide to tangle with us, they will have their heads on pikes before its over. The cost to us will be significant, but I don't think the outcome is in doubt.
Syria first: if Syria were to be caught with their flies open and their faces hanging out shipping weapons to regime loyalists, or hiding Saddam, or attacking American targets in Iraq, we could see the Fourth ID move westward. We would have the same problems occupying Syria as Iraq, though on a slightly smaller scale, as Syria is a smaller nation. Plus side, less ethnic divisions, end of large-scale support for terror in Israel and Lebanon, another nation freed from brutal dictatorship. Downside, another hundred or so American dead in the fighting, and likely another hundred or so in the occupation. And, a few billion dollars. We'd also have to find troops to replace those moving out of Iraq, and that would likely mean calling up National Guard troops. I think this is a low probability scenario I think Bashar Assad is clever enough not to stick his willie into the meatgrinder.
North Korea: while I said earlier that there is a very good chance we could induce the collapse of the communist government by cutting off aid - an embargo, there is the chance that the stark raving lunatic nutbags in Pyongyang could say, "Fuck it, we're toast, let's see how many we can take with us!" In this case, we have many advantages that we would not have if we took the offensive. One, we're on the defensive. Moltke the elder back in Prussia commented on the advantages of the strategic offense, tactical defense. Put the North Korean nutters in a tight spot, and if they attack, they have to attack us where we're strong. We and the South Koreans have had decades to prepare for a North Korean invasion. While they could inflict severe damage to the city and residents of Seoul, I seriously doubt that any North Korean tank gets more than twenty miles from the DMZ. Meanwhile, American Air Force, Marine and Naval Aviation make their lives hell. Marines and Special Forces can maneuver behind enemy lines. Amphibious landings. Paradrops. Total mayhem. The complete destruction of the North Korean army. There are over a million men in the NK army. They are equipped with fifties era technology. The South Koreans are almost as well equipped as we are. This is not a serious contest.
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