perfidy

Guinness IS good for you!

B laid down the challenge a while back, and it's been sitting in the back of my head ever since. The problem is definitely hard -- how do we "fix" the situation over there, assuming that we do not have magic time machines. At this exact moment I feel a magic time machine is actually our best option. Now that I think about it, developing a time machine might be cheaper than extracting ourselves from this mess. Be that as it may:

The US has the following overarching goal: To reduce the security threat against the US, worldwide. In the age of the super-empowered man, technology is a growing threat; one that can cause remarkable devastation. It is not so much the technologies of today that we are worried about; rather, it is the technology that will be available twenty years from now. We must embark on courses of action now that will yield a more secure environment in the future, several decades hence.

A secondary goal of the US is to preserve a measure of economic dominance over the rest of the world, to the extent that is possible.

We'll stipulate that liberating Iraq is, in the moral sense, the "right" thing to do. I won't stipulate that this particular liberation gives the US the most human rights bang for its buck; it's not even close. Remember, two days Army $$ time in Iraq is more than Bush's entire commitment to solve problems like AIDS.

I recall when the war was launched that I was decidedly unsure about it. I couldn't really make up my mind whether or not it was the right thing to do. The WMD explanation just didn't really make any sense; for the Administration to claim now that "every thought there were WMD" just doesn't make any sense. There were plenty of people (like, practically everybody) in the world that didn't think they existed in any significant quantity.

Quotes abound from the Adminstration and its penumbra before the war, telling us how it will cost next to nothing, there will be open arms waiting, and how Iraqi oil will take care of everything. These things have not come to pass, and while I believe that most Iraqi people are happy that Hussein is gone, much needs to be done to ensure that some feral Islamic Fundamentalism does not take root, and we do not swap one oppression for another.

We don't want to have hundreds of dead and thousands of injured so a bunch of nutcases can take charge, by default.

I think I've criticized enough. So what are the policies I would engage?

1. Institute an immediate, life-long permanent 3% tax cut for regular force members with a minimum of five years service OR deployment to a combat zone. Give the same tax cut to reservists who are deployed to a combat zone. Pay for this tax cut (which won't cost much) by chopping Bush's tax cut to the wealthy by a micro-fraction. This accomplishes a couple of things: First, we stop giving our Armed Forces personnel flowery platitudes, and actually do something that will help them. It's a permanent thank-you. And yes, I believe it is right for wealthy industrialists having their feet rubbed by young models to pay for it. Their freedom is being guaranteed by men and women in dust and danger.

2. Begin a grass-roots democratization of Iraq. Start with something very simple -- organize blocks of the city, and ask people on each block who should represent them on that block. Start with that person. Roll up the blocks into large precincts, and larger units. Provide funding for this exercise, secure conference facilities, communications (cell phones), and organization of the issues. This "semi-democracy" gets some say pushed down into the people almost immediately. Most Iraqis are offended by the Governing Council -- they think it is full of sycophants and profiteers. They may be right. It certainly isn't effective. The GC is top-down, and ineffective. What's needed is bottom-up organization. Send the Dean people over there; they get this shit.

3. Organize three different groups of Iraqi scholars to draft constitutions. They're going to compete against each other to produce the best document, and the population is going to have a referendum to pick one. Make available a variety of modern constitutions for perusal. The Governing Council shouldn't be in charge of this one -- let it be an academic exercise at first, then publicize intermediate drafts. Pay for all publication of this material -- deliver it to every house in the country, so that every Iraqi has a chance to read these structuring documents.

4. Vigorously pursue the use of Iraqi companies to do reconstruction and repair work. Let the Iraqis use their own standards and methods. By all accounts the American and international companies doing reconstruction work in Iraq are incredibly overpriced, inefficient, and not doing what really needs to be done. More than anything else, using local companies is an exercise in positive long-term relationship management. After all, we're essentially sticking Iraqis with the bill for all of this, in the long run. We would like for their children, paying this debt twenty years from now, to at least think that they got a good deal for their money.

5. Make it clear to France and Russia that Iraq's debt level is a problem, and if international support for the democratization of Iraq is not forthcoming in terms of troops and aid, portions of that debt are going to be "restructured". They're trying to screw us right now, and in some sense the US deserves it. Bush's insults are not being forgotten. Since they're not going to love us any time soon, we might as well get into it with them, and make it clear that there's going to be plenty of pain to go around.

6. Immediately shift materiel emphasis away from the fancy-ass "smart" weapons that cost a million bucks apiece to blow up a camel. Move some of this cash into ground troop equipment, so the soldiers get the kevlar vests they need to survive.

7. Decentralize. Shift some aspects of the command out of Baghdad. Move government offices away from Baghdad. Moving vulnerable targets out of the city makes sense, either to the countryside or to other, less violent cities. Pay for the Red Cross to set up outside the city. Pay for the UN to do the same. Provide free transportation, via buses, to these sites from most areas in the city.

8. Drop the remaining part of the Bush tax cuts, and redirect the money into warfighting accounts. We're going to need it.

9. Create a corps of several hundred contemporary Iraqi story gatherers. Their job is to go out into the community and collect stories and opinions from, recording everything they see and hear. Publish all this, in as raw and unedited a form as possible, for free. I know this sounds spacy, but there has to be a way to connect Iraqis with the positive potential for change. Creating a history as they go along is one way to get at the problem. I distinguish from reporting -- I want more historian than reporter.

10. Abandon plans to lower the force level in the coming months. Everyone knows that the only reason this pullback is planned is for political cover. Don't bother. This is past politics -- every single soldier-oriented piece I read talks about how the hours are long and hard, and that there's just too much ground to cover, too many things to do...we cannot simply go by the pronouncements of senior officers. They're being told what to say, and they know what happens if they don't say it. Look up "Shinseki".

11. Fully fund our current account at the UN, which will cost several billion. It may help to regain the trust of some. Offer to underwrite half the cost of UN humanitarian efforts in Iraq, for a period of time.

It seems like much of this list has a pretty large price tag attached to it. It does...and it's unavoidable at this point. More on this topic when I'm not so tired.

Space Daily is reporting that the Chinese have announced more details for its Lunar plans. Within the next three years, the Chinese will launch a Lunar orbiting probe, which is intended to produce three dimensional maps of the lunar surface, information on the composition of the Moon's surface, maps of lunar soil depth, and measurements of the environment between the Earth and the moon.

Beyond the lunar orbiter phase of the plan, the Chinese also hope to develop a automated lunar lander, possibly equipped with a pathfinder-style robotic rover, and eventually a sample return mission. All of this presumably leads to the possibility of a manned Chinese lunar mission, which has been a stated goal of the Chinese space program for some time.

Which means that Burt Rutan needs to get moving so that by the time the creaky apparatus of the Chinese Communist government lands on the moon, they'll find Americans already there, selling timeshare condos and opening amusement parks.

[wik] Do you realize how cool a lunar amusement park would be? Just think of the roller coasters you could build in 1/6th gravity. Also, in weak grasp of the Moon's pull, you could literally strap on wings and fly.

[alsø wik] I really hope that whatever successes the Chinese have in their space program, it does not result in some panicky space race reaction on the part of the American government. The best way to kick ChiCom ass is simply to let the unlimited creativity of the American economy to the job.

The most common defense Republicans had on the financial responsibility issue was that things went well in the Clinton era because "the GOP was in charge of congress". Well, they're in charge of everything at the moment, and what do we have? Federal discretionary spending growth of 12.5%. Excluding "one-time" charges (I use quotes because there isn't anybody left who thinks that Iraq and our other little wars are going to be one-time), the growth in spending is still 7.9%.

Compare that figure to an average, under Clinton, of 2.4% per year.

So what is going on?

Clearly the GOP is losing the ability to call themselves fiscally conservative. They're not; clearly they are rather incredibly financially irresponsible. Bush's platitudes about reining in the cost of government were either campaign BS, or he just doesn't have a clue about how to do it.

Here's my hint...bring Clinton back in. He managed to turn everything around once before, and chances are he can do it again.

The most likely effect of this is that the GOP will become even more stridently socially conservative, and will begin to break down the wallsl of tolerance that have existed. With numbers like these, and their credibility being destroyed in virtually every direction, the only way they can hang on to power is by using the mechanisms of fear.

To do that they need to create divisions in the population, reward one side, then malign, punish, or silence the other side. They need to create a series of national litmus tests; where "real" citizens pass, and others don't. Pick your issue: Abortion, Patriotism, Tax Breaks...all of these are being used to create divisions and generate support. It has become clear to me that the cynicism and/or incompetence of those in power is approaching critical levels.

[url="http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A28252-2003Nov11?language=printer]Government Outgrows Cap Set by President[/url]

Gregg Easterbrook, he of the donnybrooks (ooh! piquant!) over race, economics, and the Elders of Zion, has returned to the only thing he should be allowed to do in public: write about football.

Tuesday Morning Quarterback, which recently was erased from ESPN so totally I was doubting my own memories of reading it, is back at footballoutsiders.com.

[mincing, jerky victory dance]

While you're over there, do check out the main footballoutsiders site. They do statistical modelling of football in the way that Bill James and Baseball Prospectus do for baseball, and are good writers to boot. It's almost enough to make me like math.

A year ago this week, in fact a year ago this Friday, I got word that the axe was going to fall on my incredibly rewarding yet aggravating music-industry job. The label was going through some changes, and one change was that music fans would no longer be needed. Or so I editorialize.

Upon hearing the news, I went out and did the proper music-industry thing; got straight shitfaced on tequila and beer. I knew it was coming. The dumbest Labrador retriever ever born could not have missed the signs. But that didn't make the fact any more fun. And so; tequila.

Now, a year later, I find that I've lost touch with that thing that I went into the business to cultivate-- my enthusiasm, my mania, for awesome fucking rock and majestic thunderous roll. I don't buy records. I don't go to shows. I don't read the magazines, not even Mojo. On the other hand, I also no longer compulsively analyze everything I hear from a marketing-cost-per-unit perspective, which is nice, but the joy which I bled away at some point during the end days of my too-short career never quite came back like I hoped it would.

Last Friday on the train home, I got kind of sad. I was listening to "In A Silent Way" and as the disc got to that part about 10:42 into "Shhh/Peaceful" where Teo Macero really screwed up the edit and two parts mash together like a Lydian-mode trainwreck, I realized that a few years ago, that shit would have given me chills. Not so much any more. Music comes second in my life right after family, and several steps before food, shelter, and Italian shoes. And yet, meh.

So I need all y'all's help. Despite my limited resources and lack of shelf space (in fact, my wife has forbidden me from exceeding my current 30 shelf-feet cd footprint), I need to know. What music in is setting your ass on fire?

My kickass purchases in the last twelve months have been few. The Flaming Lips' "The Soft Bulletin. "Up From The Cellar," the Motown rarities compilation. I finally repurchased REM's "Automatic for the People." But that's it. A far cry from the halcyon days when every! single! week! brought a new wonder: Turbonegro; Josh Rouse; Black Rebel Motorcycle Club; Don Cherry; The Yeah Yeah Yeahs; an eventual collection of dozens of Zappa discs; ...and You Will Know Us By The Trail of Dead; The Sheila Divine; Erin McKeown; Rhinoceros; Sigur Ros; The North Mississippi All Stars; Mirah; Robert Randolph; Aceyalone; Shuggie Otis; Oren Blowdow [sp?], Dr. Octagon; Buck Owens reissues; Handsome Boy Modeling School; Antibales; The Fucking Champs; Gorillaz; Los Amigos Invisibles; and the greatest of all, a concert by the great Princess Superstar herself aboard a floating party boat in the Hudson River.

I hope those days aren't gone for good, because that would suck mightily. So help a brother out. What's ringing your bell?

The Supremes, fresh off a tour of Japan, are going back in the recording studio, this time to hear an appeal on behalf of detainees held at Guantanamo Bay.

The issue at stake is whether US law extends to that foreign soil. The Military and Executive claim that Gitmo is and always has been under Cuban sovereignty. The appellates argue that they are being held in violation of international laws that the US is bound to uphold under treaty.

Here's what I think. The whole Gitmo/military tribunal thing is a cheap dodge of our judicial system, and one that the Administration ought to be ashamed of. So far there have been exactly Zero military tribunals, and very little other movement towards processing, prosecuting, and/or releasing any person held there. In a time when the US is attempting to assert the primacy of democracy in the world, it's both dangerous and two-faced to circumvent those very laws at home.

I'm not going to argue that the people being held at Guantanamo Bay are heroes, much less all good folks. That's vanishingly unlikely. But indefinite detentions coupled with no examination of whether these are the guys to detain is a scary precedent, as is the doublethink that allows the government to assert US domain over Guantanamo Bay when necessary, and deny the same when convenient. As the Washington Post puts it, "The administration effectively asks Americans to tolerate the indefinite detention of large numbers of people with no charge, no accountability and no seeming urgency about making the rule of law into a reality."

The Post article linked above does a good job of articulating the issues at hand. Go read!

You can be for, you can be against, but you can't deny that there wasn't a single woman on the stage when Bush was signing it.

From the White House site (for as long as it stays available):

Signing Ceremony

Via some providential linkage, I came upon Management By Baseball, a weblog by a gent who draws lessons from baseball's organizational and managerial behavior and applies them to the regular business world. He's got some great insights and better yet is witty and concise.

His is a competing/complimentary to the "Moneyball" thesis, in that in the MBB model, lessons flow from baseball to biz, and Sabermetric managers attempt to do more or less the opposite.

I love convergence!

Just when you're trying to find out what the truth really is, somebody makes it disappear. The Memory Hole has noted that an article in Time Magazine, written in March 1998 by George Bush Sr., has disappeared from the site. The article is entitled "Reasons Not to Invade Iraq".

Even more mysteriously, the article has also disappeared from the online table of contents for that issue.

In the interests of making sure that it doesn't pull another disappearing act, the article is below.

"Why We Didn't Remove Saddam"

George Bush [Sr.] and Brent Scowcroft
Time (2 March 1998)

The end of effective Iraqi resistance came with a rapidity which surprised us all, and we were perhaps psychologically unprepared for the sudden transition from fighting to peacemaking. True to the guidelines we had established, when we had achieved our strategic objectives (ejecting Iraqi forces from Kuwait and eroding Saddam's threat to the region) we stopped the fighting. But the necessary limitations placed on our objectives, the fog of war, and the lack of "battleship Missouri" surrender unfortunately left unresolved problems, and new ones arose.

We were disappointed that Saddam's defeat did not break his hold on power, as many of our Arab allies had predicted and we had come to expect. President Bush repeatedly declared that the fate of Saddam Hussein was up to the Iraqi people. Occasionally, he indicated that removal of Saddam would be welcome, but for very practical reasons there was never a promise to aid an uprising. While we hoped that popular revolt or coup would topple Saddam, neither the U.S. nor the countries of the region wished to see the breakup of the Iraqi state. We were concerned about the long-term balance of power at the head of the Gulf. Trying to eliminate Saddam, extending the ground war into an occupation of Iraq, would have violated our guideline about not changing objectives in midstream, engaging in "mission creep," and would have incurred incalculable human and political costs. Apprehending him was probably impossible. We had been unable to find Noriega in Panama, which we knew intimately. We would have been forced to occupy Baghdad and, in effect, rule Iraq. The coalition would instantly have collapsed, the Arabs deserting it in anger and other allies pulling out as well. Under those circumstances, furthermore, we had been self-consciously trying to set a pattern for handling aggression in the post-cold war world. Going in and occupying Iraq, thus unilaterally exceeding the U.N.'s mandate, would have destroyed the precedent of international response to aggression we hoped to establish. Had we gone the invasion route, the U.S. could conceivably still be an occupying power in a bitterly hostile land. It would have been a dramatically different--and perhaps barren--outcome.

We discussed at length forcing Saddam himself to accept the terms of Iraqi defeat at Safwan--just north of the Kuwait-Iraq border--and thus the responsibility and political consequences for the humiliation of such a devastating defeat. In the end, we asked ourselves what we would do if he refused. We concluded that we would be left with two options: continue the conflict until he backed down, or retreat from our demands. The latter would have sent a disastrous signal. The former would have split our Arab colleagues from the coalition and, de facto, forced us to change our objectives. Given those unpalatable choices, we allowed Saddam to avoid personal surrender and permitted him to send one of his generals. Perhaps we could have devised a system of selected punishment, such as air strikes on different military units, which would have proved a viable third option, but we had fulfilled our well-defined mission; Safwan was waiting.

As the conflict wound down, we felt a sense of urgency on the part of the coalition Arabs to get it over with and return to normal. This meant quickly withdrawing U.S. forces to an absolute minimum. Earlier there had been some concern in Arab ranks that once they allowed U.S. forces into the Middle East, we would be there to stay. Saddam's propaganda machine fanned these worries. Our prompt withdrawal helped cement our position with our Arab allies, who now trusted us far more than they ever had. We had come to their assistance in their time of need, asked nothing for ourselves, and left again when the job was done. Despite some criticism of our conduct of the war, the Israelis too had their faith in us solidified. We had shown our ability--and willingness--to intervene in the Middle East in a decisive way when our interests were challenged. We had also crippled the military capability of one of their most bitter enemies in the region. Our new credibility (coupled with Yasser Arafat's need to redeem his image after backing the wrong side in the war) had a quick and substantial payoff in the form of a Middle East peace conference in Madrid.

The Gulf War had far greater significance to the emerging post-cold war world than simply reversing Iraqi aggression and restoring Kuwait. Its magnitude and significance impelled us from the outset to extend our strategic vision beyond the crisis to the kind of precedent we should lay down for the future. From an American foreign-policymaking perspective, we sought to respond in a manner which would win broad domestic support and which could be applied universally to other crises. In international terms, we tried to establish a model for the use of force. First and foremost was the principle that aggression cannot pay. If we dealt properly with Iraq, that should go a long way toward dissuading future would-be aggressors. We also believed that the U.S. should not go it alone, that a multilateral approach was better. This was, in part, a practical matter. Mounting an effective military counter to Iraq's invasion required the backing and bases of Saudi Arabia and other Arab states.