perfidy

I'm perhaps overly sensitive to the inanity of the supposed security at our nation's airports, having seen too many instances of Barney Fife syndrome on the part of puffed up losers at various airports. While I'm sure there are many competent screeners, they all seem to work shifts that keep us coming in contact. My typical encounter with the breed makes me certain that they had three choices: TSA, some form of work requiring a white paper hat and a name tag, or one or another variety of animal husbandry. Sadly, in each case, they didn't read past the first item.

Watching these folks, in fits of mild sadism, drag uniformed pilots (to say nothing of blue-haired grandmothers and crying 6 year olds) through baseless subjugation has always struck me as misguided and fruitless.

But, on a recent trip through this month's opinings from Bruce Schneier, I saw another of his recent essays (in addition to the item I've added as an update to the drug-related post below). This one is entitled "Focus on terrorists, not tactics". I found it an interesting read, and commend it to your attention.

Key points include:

• Everything you know about airport security, you can pretty much ignore as a device to keep you safe
• No fly lists, secondary screening, prohibition of fingernail clippers, Richard Reid inspired shoe-checks, and the rest, had nothing to do with foiling the plot at Heathrow
• Neither did banning box-cutters
• Old-fashioned intelligence work, however, did
• The resulting intensified security measures are prudent
• But will cease to be, shortly

His point, well and succinctly articulated, is that strategy is more important than tactics. Standard fare, really, but he expounds:

It's easy to defend against what the terrorists planned last time, but it's shortsighted. If we spend billions fielding liquid-analysis machines in airports and the terrorists use solid explosives, we've wasted our money. If they target shopping malls, we've wasted our money. Focusing on tactics simply forces the terrorists to make a minor modification in their plans. There are too many targets -- stadiums, schools, theaters, churches, the long line of densely packed people before airport security -- and too many ways to kill people.

Security measures that require us to guess correctly don't work, because invariably we will guess wrong. It's not security, it's security theater: measures designed to make us feel safer but not actually safer.

Airport security is the last line of defense, and not a very good one at that. Sure, it'll catch the sloppy and the stupid -- and that's a good enough reason not to do away with it entirely -- but it won't catch a well-planned plot. We can't keep weapons out of prisons; we can't possibly keep them off airplanes.

(emphasis mine)

Given the choices of capitulation, constant and counterproductive "pretend" security measures, or applying a bit of brainpower and shoe leather to the problem while still treating it like a life-or-death chess game, I'd choose the latter. And not just because I have a fondness for cheesy spy thrillers.