More troops, part one
The recent reports of troops being rotated home for two week leave highlight some of the problems that we have faced in maintaining military preparedness when the military is being asked to handle so very many jobs. I commented earlier on the extent to which our forces were committed, and the need to expand the military to meet even current requirements.
But how should we expand the military, and how much? In this post and its sequels, I will concentrate on the Army, and on Army logistical issues that affect the other services. I have more ideas for what to do with the other services, but that will have to wait for later.
In general, but especially for the last twenty years or so, the United States has emphasized quality over quantity. During most of the cold war, it was assumed that highly trained, lavishly equipped American soldiers would be able to stem the red tide should the Soviets ever decide to kick off WWIII. During the 80s, ever-greater sums were devoted to developing advanced weaponry to equip our forces for confrontation with their Soviet counterparts.
By the 90s, advances in American civilian technology began to greatly affect the types of weapons that the military could develop. Space and computer technology made possible the revolution in smart, brilliant, and jesus-thats-smart weapons that we now see in the hands of our military. These wizard weapons allow soldiers to fight in the dark, our tanks to shoot completely through enemy tanks, Air Force pilots to target individual rooms in buildings, and so on. But the core of our amazing military effectiveness lies not in the panoply of wizard weapons our soldiers carry, but in the communications and logistics technologies that surround them.
Our military is wired for communications to a level unimaginable fifteen years ago. Military networks allow information and intelligence to be transmitted to troops in the field with remarkable rapidity. These networks allow units to coordinate their activities to the point where they can act almost like a single intelligence. This is what gives us our flexibility, adaptability and speed. This is the heart of our lethality.
When we think about what kinds of units we would like to add to the army, these are things that need to be kept in mind. But before we even think about adding more troops, we need to think about how to move them.
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I remember looking at a book
I remember looking at a book dedicated to designing war games (entertainment, not drilling.) It said that having Napoleon in command is the equivalent of 50,000 to 100,000 troops. Of course, one could not just have Napoleon and a group of guys--his value makes sense only in the context of a mass army.
I am not entirely convinced that the emphasis on the development of military technology should replace increases in the manpower of the armed forces. Bush has put many soldiers overseas. It looks like they will be there for years, if not decades. It appears to be a strain to scrounge up a few thousand to put into Liberia (the debate over their mission aside.) While the technical accomplishments of the military are impressive, I do not think that it can replace manpower. One example: the US has no troops who are capable of acting as an occupational bureaucracy, especially in matters concerning civilian security.
I would say more, but I have drank more bears than I have had hours of sleep.
BTW, I meant beers. I am too
BTW, I meant beers. I am too tired
The thrust of this whole
The thrust of this whole series of posts is that we do need to add more actual troops. I agree sompletely. The technology is what makes our troops so very effective, but technology absent actual troops is useless.
In a post that will go up later today, I will make the case for a division of occupation troops.
But drinking bears is cool...