perfidy

Okay, it’s a cheesy headline. But I have been expecting a couple of the military oriented bloggers to jump in on this, and I haven’t really seen anything substantive. The RAH-66 Comanche is (or was) intended to be the next generation, double-plus lethal, stealthy/sneaky reconnaissance/attack helicopter for the Army. We have already spent $8 billion on the development, and will have to spend an additional $2 billion in contract termination fees if the project actually goes south. The rationale for canceling the project is that the money saved by not building the Comanche will be used to buy almost 800 more UH-60 Blackhawk utility transport helicopters, upgrade and modernize 1,400 helicopters already in the fleet, and invest more heavily in a variety of unmanned aircraft, such as the existing Hunter and the new Raven.

Unlike the earlier decision to cancel the Crusader artillery system (which also was very expensive) I have mixed feelings about this one. The Crusader was to be a highly advanced, highly mobile artillery system. It would have given the army a precision stand off artillery system that could keep up with the turbine powered M1 Abrams tank on the battlefield. Its computerized and networked fire control system would be integrated into the army’s battlefield tactical networks. It would be able to put massive firepower anywhere the army wanted, quickly, efficiently and accurately.

This system would have been perfect for destroying large armored opponents like the Red Army. Sadly, the Red Army no longer exists, and the Crusader was not exactly what a lighter, more deployable Army needed. So I could see the logic in canceling it. It didn’t fit the army’s new idiom of freewheeling, fast and decentralized, precision netcentric warfare.

But the Comanche does fit that idiom. It is fast, stealthy, and lethal. Our mobility is crucial to our new mode of warfare. And the Comanche is a highly mobile weapons and reconnaissance platform. Our current flock of attack helicopters is aging, and no matter how many weapons, sensor and avionics upgrades they receive, there are some capabilities they will never provide, and the Comanche was intended to address those shortfalls.
The Comanche’s stealth and noise suppression technology would have allowed it to penetrate enemy or contested airspace with much greater ease than the current models. Its greater range means easier logistical support and greater strike radius. And the fact that all the modern avionics are designed in from the start means easier maintenance and greater effectiveness. Even if we had not gone ahead with the initial plan to purchase thousands of Comanches, several hundred would increase the effectiveness of units equipped with both Comanches and older attack and reconnaissance helicopters.

To be sure, the Comanche is expensive – over $50 million each. But cost is not the only consideration when deciding whether to continue with a weapons program. These are expensive projects, whether we cancel them or not. Does the system increase the lethality of our forces? Will its presence on the battlefield reduce the likelihood of American casualties? What threat is the program meant to address? We have to think carefully about what we cancel. As the vastly increased operational tempo of our military eats into funding, we have to ensure that R&D, training and procurement budgets are not savaged as we fight the war on terror. I think, from what I have read, that the Comanche would be a worthwhile addition to our armamentarium. It will increase our ability to fight enemies on any battlefield, regardless of their technological sophistication. And that will save lives.

Other military projects are potentially on the block, waiting for the ax. The Air Force’s F-22 Raptor has narrowly averted execution several times, as has the Marine V-22 Osprey. We need to look at these and other programs in the same way.

• The Crusader designed to deal with heavy armored forces, is no longer relevant, and it made sense to cancel it.
• The F-22 is an incredible fighter – it is stealthy, agile, heavily armed and can cruise at supersonic speeds. There is no fighter in any Air Force that could defeat it. But that is also true of the fighters we already have. It would only be an incremental increase in our effectiveness against any likely opponent, who are unlikely to be any serious threat to our air superiority. Build a squadron for when it absolutely, positively has to be destroyed overnight, and spend the money on the much cheaper (but still better than anything except the F-22) F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Which also has a real ground attack capability.
• The V-22 Osprey, the tilt-rotor troop transport, is a great idea. The Osprey takes off like a helicopter, and then its twin rotors rotate forward, allowing it to fly like an airplane. Thus, it combines the helicopter's ability to land and takeoff anywhere, with the airplane's speed, payload capacity and range. There have been four crashes in ten years, raising concerns about its safety, but many have argued that this is to be expected in a completely new type of aircraft. If accepted, the Osprey would allow the Marines to deploy faster and further than ever before, and ease logistical support as well. Adding this capability makes sense. Thumbs up.

Its all a matter of looking at where the project in question would fit into the battlefield, and determining whether its worth the money. (Including the opportunity cost - could we develop some other weapons system that is even more effective with the money?)