... and the Lines on the Map Moved From Side to Side
In a recent Pentagon press conference, Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker discussed the new challenges faced by the modern Army and some of the steps being taken to overcome them.
Here's the short version: 30,000 more soldiers and some new org charts.
I've been out of the Army for a long time and never served in combat. While I do take an interest in Army issues, my opinions are those of a grabastic civilian and colored by the sepia tones of old memories and forgotten hardship. But as best as I can tell, I see alot of problems with the modern force.
For starters, the Army spends too much time playing with org charts, and producing paper, and encouraging Powerpoint Rangers, than on ugly gritty reality of combat as reflected through training. This was true even in my time, and the proliferation of powerful computers and software has magnified the problem. A friend once joked that if we really wanted to be rid of the Iraqi army, just drop them some laptops with Powerpoint and let nature take its course- they'd be crippled with busywork in a matter of weeks.
I know that the Army is serious, in theory, about training as we fight. And I know that the NTC, CMTC, Grafenwoehr, Wildflecken, etc etc are truly ugly gritty places. I mean, it literally doesn't get grittier than having to shit in a hole scratched out of the desert floor, and it doesn't get uglier than training so hard that real people get really killed (Businessweek, 28OCT02 reported 2,487 deaths from accidents, across all service branches, from 1990-92). The Army goes to great expense to make its training areas and scenarios as realistic as possible.
I think the bigger problem is at the basic training level, when recruits are first taught the fundamentals of soldiering. When I took basic training my unit spent about 3 weeks out of 8 on basic rifle marksmanship, or BRM. So even though we were taught about Bastogne, and told that every soldier is an infantryman first, we spent less than half our training time learning marksmanship, the fundamental skill of the infantryman. Since then, there is less effort to demonstrate the mental challenges that come from being under duress, ie by screaming and yelling at trainees. Training units are co-ed. New soldiers take diversity and sensitivity training. All told, there should be alot more emphasis on the shooty bits, and a lot less on soldiers' feelings about it.
And that all feeds into General Schoomaker's plans for Army restructuring. He wants to oversee turning a relative few heavy Army divisions into a few dozen independent brigades, and there's something to be said for that. He wants more soldiers across the board, to better staff those units and make deployments easier all around, and that makes sense.
But until the Army goes back into the business of training warriors, drawing out new soldiers' nascent martial instincts from day one, the good General's reorganization is simply a logistics exercise.
[wik] This bit from Stars and Stripes explains a little more clearly what General Schoomaker has in mind. He doesn't want to break up divisions into beefier component brigades, but create 15 or so entirely new units, manned with his 30,000 more troops.
But then came this quote, and I see what the problem may be in attempting communication with the general. I'm totally lost in the haze of pronouns:
This war, as unfortunate as war always is, provides momentum and focus and resources to transform that you might not have outside of this, Schoomaker said. And what we are able to do, as we rotate forces, as we reset them, is this momentum and focus allows us to reset them for the future, not reset them as they were in the past. And so this has given us a great forcing function to allow us to do it.
Clear as an azure sky!
§ 3 Comments
[ You're too late, comments are closed ]


Aughagh! How can you use the
Aughagh! How can you use the word "grabastic," and the non-word "alot" in the same paragraph? If you're going to rebut that "Aughhagh" isn't a word, I'll agree: it was a spasm of incredulity, that's all.
Didn't I read somewhere that
Didn't I read somewhere that DoD is planning to have the Marines do basic training for all the services? I would think that that might alleviate your concerns about fundamental soldiering. I agree that there are too many peacetime generals who spend their time scheming for relative advantage, and too few who are fighting generals who just want to get the job done. I don't know how to solve that problem since top generals need to make nicey-nice with Congress to get the money for any level of military capability, and fighting generals tend to be rather blunt and intolerant of the kind of bullshit that flows inside the beltway.
Personally, I rather like the things that Rummy has done. He's actually getting those O-10's in the Pentagon to fight someone else instead of each other. Let's hope he stays there long enough to get the job done.
JF,
JF,
Never heard that about the Marines. I can see the utility of taking the Corps ethos though, and more thoroughly applying it to Army basic training. You know, one big piece that's missing from Army training- and we're getting a little off topic here- is a sense of history. Marines spend alot of time learning Corps history. Soldiers might learn some random stuff here and there, but the larger training purpose, of building esprit de corp in the service, is lost.
I think you and I are of one mind concerning generals. Problem is that you don't get to that level of responsibility without having your politics in order- strange bedfellows and all that. Even your "fighting generals" sometimes have an eye on that next star and know what they need to choke on before they can get it. But before you even get to contracts and R&D and pork $$, you have to be nominated, vetted, etc. for general officer. Those who aren't politically minded, or pissed in some Senator's Wheaties at some point...well, there are an awful lot of retired colonels out there.
Rummy: I like the idea of moving away from heavy divisions to independent brigades. Any mech or armor brigade is something of a mini-division as it stands, and simply some fraction (often 1/3) of a divisional structure anyway. Maybe reducing or eliminating a larger divisional org can streamline log, staffing, etc. But what is the cost in coordinated firepower and mass? I don't know.
But I think the issue of improving the Army to better face vicious, bloodthirsty islamonutters goes far, far beyond cranking out new spreadsheets, which seemed to be the thrust of Gen Schoomaker's statement. And I believe the place to start is initial entry training, when those kids first get off the bus.