perfidy

The Columbia report is justly critical of NASA. Here are some interesting quotes from the report.

"The measure of NASA's success became how much costs were reduced and how efficiently the schedule was met. But the space shuttle is not now, nor has it ever been, an operational vehicle. We cannot explore space on a fixed-cost basis."

NASA's most remarkable achievement is not the moon mission, or the construction of the space station. It is the transformation of something as remarkable and romantic as exploration in space into something as boring as a discovery channel documentary on public transportation. The shuttle was never a space truck. It was not that mature a technology. In aviation terms, it was more like the Wright Flyer. Only when we have actually built, tested and flown regularly many types of advanced reusable launch vehicles will we be in a position to operate in space as we do in the air. The shuttle never was and still isn't more than an awkwardly designed experimental vehicle.

"The organizational causes of this accident are rooted in the space shuttle program's history and culture, including the original compromises that were required to gain approval for the shuttle, subsequent years of resource constraints, fluctuating priorities, schedule pressures, mischaracterization of the shuttle as operational rather than developmental, and lack of agreed national vision for human space flight."

I talked a lot about mission and goals in my last shuttle post. But we should know better than to expect operational efficiency from a government program. (Not that it's impossible... just rare.)

"Perhaps most striking is the fact that management . . . displayed no interest in understanding a problem and its implications.

Sheesh.

"It is tempting to conclude that replacing them will solve NASA's problems... However, solving NASA's problems are not quite so easily achieved. People's actions are influenced by the organizations in which they work, shaping their choices in directions that even they may not realize."

Which is why we should kill NASA. The scapegoat is not the managers, but the system. It's like the old joke about the Federal Reserve - if Jesus and the Twelve Apostles were appointed to the Board of the Fed - and not allowed to change the rules - it would still be an abomination.

"We believe another vehicle, whether to complement or replace the shuttle, is very, very high priority. We criticize the U.S. for finding ourselves in the position we are in now where we don't even have a design on the drawing board."

Thanks to indecisive lawmakers and unpredictable funding. And NASA leaders who don't seem to appreciate the need for something to replace the shuttle - which has never been as cheap to fly as promised, let alone as cheap as they claim it is now. Too much ego is invested in the shuttle, "the most sophisticated and complex artifact ever designed by man." Would you fly an airliner that had been described that way?

On these longer term recommendations, the report sounds a sobering note: "Based on NASA's history of ignoring external recommendations, or making improvements that atrophy with time, the Board has no confidence that the Space Shuttle can be safely operated for more than a few years based solely on renewed post-accident vigilance."

And even if the board's recommendations are adopted, we will likely have another catastrophic failure if we continue to use the shuttle for another ten years. Accidents will be more, not less likely as the shuttles age.