perfidy

There's nothing a loyal Republican enjoys more than "reading" something like Ted Rall's essay on motivations in Iraq at a Grade 2 level, and sliding obliviously past the deeper meanings encoded in those oh-so-tricksy wordies.

"Writes like he means it". Bullshit. Go read Rall's article and find a way to read it as anything other than insight into what the enemy's possible strategy is. Makes sense to me. Now the question is, what do we do about it?

"Some people want the terrorists to win." What a crock of shit. You might find the odd nutjob out there, but by and large, the loyal opposition in this country wants an adjustment of strategy, not goal.

B laid down the challenge a while back, and it's been sitting in the back of my head ever since. The problem is definitely hard -- how do we "fix" the situation over there, assuming that we do not have magic time machines. At this exact moment I feel a magic time machine is actually our best option. Now that I think about it, developing a time machine might be cheaper than extracting ourselves from this mess. Be that as it may:

The US has the following overarching goal: To reduce the security threat against the US, worldwide. In the age of the super-empowered man, technology is a growing threat; one that can cause remarkable devastation. It is not so much the technologies of today that we are worried about; rather, it is the technology that will be available twenty years from now. We must embark on courses of action now that will yield a more secure environment in the future, several decades hence.

A secondary goal of the US is to preserve a measure of economic dominance over the rest of the world, to the extent that is possible.

We'll stipulate that liberating Iraq is, in the moral sense, the "right" thing to do. I won't stipulate that this particular liberation gives the US the most human rights bang for its buck; it's not even close. Remember, two days Army $$ time in Iraq is more than Bush's entire commitment to solve problems like AIDS.

I recall when the war was launched that I was decidedly unsure about it. I couldn't really make up my mind whether or not it was the right thing to do. The WMD explanation just didn't really make any sense; for the Administration to claim now that "every thought there were WMD" just doesn't make any sense. There were plenty of people (like, practically everybody) in the world that didn't think they existed in any significant quantity.

Quotes abound from the Adminstration and its penumbra before the war, telling us how it will cost next to nothing, there will be open arms waiting, and how Iraqi oil will take care of everything. These things have not come to pass, and while I believe that most Iraqi people are happy that Hussein is gone, much needs to be done to ensure that some feral Islamic Fundamentalism does not take root, and we do not swap one oppression for another.

We don't want to have hundreds of dead and thousands of injured so a bunch of nutcases can take charge, by default.

I think I've criticized enough. So what are the policies I would engage?

1. Institute an immediate, life-long permanent 3% tax cut for regular force members with a minimum of five years service OR deployment to a combat zone. Give the same tax cut to reservists who are deployed to a combat zone. Pay for this tax cut (which won't cost much) by chopping Bush's tax cut to the wealthy by a micro-fraction. This accomplishes a couple of things: First, we stop giving our Armed Forces personnel flowery platitudes, and actually do something that will help them. It's a permanent thank-you. And yes, I believe it is right for wealthy industrialists having their feet rubbed by young models to pay for it. Their freedom is being guaranteed by men and women in dust and danger.

2. Begin a grass-roots democratization of Iraq. Start with something very simple -- organize blocks of the city, and ask people on each block who should represent them on that block. Start with that person. Roll up the blocks into large precincts, and larger units. Provide funding for this exercise, secure conference facilities, communications (cell phones), and organization of the issues. This "semi-democracy" gets some say pushed down into the people almost immediately. Most Iraqis are offended by the Governing Council -- they think it is full of sycophants and profiteers. They may be right. It certainly isn't effective. The GC is top-down, and ineffective. What's needed is bottom-up organization. Send the Dean people over there; they get this shit.

3. Organize three different groups of Iraqi scholars to draft constitutions. They're going to compete against each other to produce the best document, and the population is going to have a referendum to pick one. Make available a variety of modern constitutions for perusal. The Governing Council shouldn't be in charge of this one -- let it be an academic exercise at first, then publicize intermediate drafts. Pay for all publication of this material -- deliver it to every house in the country, so that every Iraqi has a chance to read these structuring documents.

4. Vigorously pursue the use of Iraqi companies to do reconstruction and repair work. Let the Iraqis use their own standards and methods. By all accounts the American and international companies doing reconstruction work in Iraq are incredibly overpriced, inefficient, and not doing what really needs to be done. More than anything else, using local companies is an exercise in positive long-term relationship management. After all, we're essentially sticking Iraqis with the bill for all of this, in the long run. We would like for their children, paying this debt twenty years from now, to at least think that they got a good deal for their money.

5. Make it clear to France and Russia that Iraq's debt level is a problem, and if international support for the democratization of Iraq is not forthcoming in terms of troops and aid, portions of that debt are going to be "restructured". They're trying to screw us right now, and in some sense the US deserves it. Bush's insults are not being forgotten. Since they're not going to love us any time soon, we might as well get into it with them, and make it clear that there's going to be plenty of pain to go around.

6. Immediately shift materiel emphasis away from the fancy-ass "smart" weapons that cost a million bucks apiece to blow up a camel. Move some of this cash into ground troop equipment, so the soldiers get the kevlar vests they need to survive.

7. Decentralize. Shift some aspects of the command out of Baghdad. Move government offices away from Baghdad. Moving vulnerable targets out of the city makes sense, either to the countryside or to other, less violent cities. Pay for the Red Cross to set up outside the city. Pay for the UN to do the same. Provide free transportation, via buses, to these sites from most areas in the city.

8. Drop the remaining part of the Bush tax cuts, and redirect the money into warfighting accounts. We're going to need it.

9. Create a corps of several hundred contemporary Iraqi story gatherers. Their job is to go out into the community and collect stories and opinions from, recording everything they see and hear. Publish all this, in as raw and unedited a form as possible, for free. I know this sounds spacy, but there has to be a way to connect Iraqis with the positive potential for change. Creating a history as they go along is one way to get at the problem. I distinguish from reporting -- I want more historian than reporter.

10. Abandon plans to lower the force level in the coming months. Everyone knows that the only reason this pullback is planned is for political cover. Don't bother. This is past politics -- every single soldier-oriented piece I read talks about how the hours are long and hard, and that there's just too much ground to cover, too many things to do...we cannot simply go by the pronouncements of senior officers. They're being told what to say, and they know what happens if they don't say it. Look up "Shinseki".

11. Fully fund our current account at the UN, which will cost several billion. It may help to regain the trust of some. Offer to underwrite half the cost of UN humanitarian efforts in Iraq, for a period of time.

It seems like much of this list has a pretty large price tag attached to it. It does...and it's unavoidable at this point. More on this topic when I'm not so tired.

Just when you're trying to find out what the truth really is, somebody makes it disappear. The Memory Hole has noted that an article in Time Magazine, written in March 1998 by George Bush Sr., has disappeared from the site. The article is entitled "Reasons Not to Invade Iraq".

Even more mysteriously, the article has also disappeared from the online table of contents for that issue.

In the interests of making sure that it doesn't pull another disappearing act, the article is below.

"Why We Didn't Remove Saddam"

George Bush [Sr.] and Brent Scowcroft
Time (2 March 1998)

The end of effective Iraqi resistance came with a rapidity which surprised us all, and we were perhaps psychologically unprepared for the sudden transition from fighting to peacemaking. True to the guidelines we had established, when we had achieved our strategic objectives (ejecting Iraqi forces from Kuwait and eroding Saddam's threat to the region) we stopped the fighting. But the necessary limitations placed on our objectives, the fog of war, and the lack of "battleship Missouri" surrender unfortunately left unresolved problems, and new ones arose.

We were disappointed that Saddam's defeat did not break his hold on power, as many of our Arab allies had predicted and we had come to expect. President Bush repeatedly declared that the fate of Saddam Hussein was up to the Iraqi people. Occasionally, he indicated that removal of Saddam would be welcome, but for very practical reasons there was never a promise to aid an uprising. While we hoped that popular revolt or coup would topple Saddam, neither the U.S. nor the countries of the region wished to see the breakup of the Iraqi state. We were concerned about the long-term balance of power at the head of the Gulf. Trying to eliminate Saddam, extending the ground war into an occupation of Iraq, would have violated our guideline about not changing objectives in midstream, engaging in "mission creep," and would have incurred incalculable human and political costs. Apprehending him was probably impossible. We had been unable to find Noriega in Panama, which we knew intimately. We would have been forced to occupy Baghdad and, in effect, rule Iraq. The coalition would instantly have collapsed, the Arabs deserting it in anger and other allies pulling out as well. Under those circumstances, furthermore, we had been self-consciously trying to set a pattern for handling aggression in the post-cold war world. Going in and occupying Iraq, thus unilaterally exceeding the U.N.'s mandate, would have destroyed the precedent of international response to aggression we hoped to establish. Had we gone the invasion route, the U.S. could conceivably still be an occupying power in a bitterly hostile land. It would have been a dramatically different--and perhaps barren--outcome.

We discussed at length forcing Saddam himself to accept the terms of Iraqi defeat at Safwan--just north of the Kuwait-Iraq border--and thus the responsibility and political consequences for the humiliation of such a devastating defeat. In the end, we asked ourselves what we would do if he refused. We concluded that we would be left with two options: continue the conflict until he backed down, or retreat from our demands. The latter would have sent a disastrous signal. The former would have split our Arab colleagues from the coalition and, de facto, forced us to change our objectives. Given those unpalatable choices, we allowed Saddam to avoid personal surrender and permitted him to send one of his generals. Perhaps we could have devised a system of selected punishment, such as air strikes on different military units, which would have proved a viable third option, but we had fulfilled our well-defined mission; Safwan was waiting.

As the conflict wound down, we felt a sense of urgency on the part of the coalition Arabs to get it over with and return to normal. This meant quickly withdrawing U.S. forces to an absolute minimum. Earlier there had been some concern in Arab ranks that once they allowed U.S. forces into the Middle East, we would be there to stay. Saddam's propaganda machine fanned these worries. Our prompt withdrawal helped cement our position with our Arab allies, who now trusted us far more than they ever had. We had come to their assistance in their time of need, asked nothing for ourselves, and left again when the job was done. Despite some criticism of our conduct of the war, the Israelis too had their faith in us solidified. We had shown our ability--and willingness--to intervene in the Middle East in a decisive way when our interests were challenged. We had also crippled the military capability of one of their most bitter enemies in the region. Our new credibility (coupled with Yasser Arafat's need to redeem his image after backing the wrong side in the war) had a quick and substantial payoff in the form of a Middle East peace conference in Madrid.

The Gulf War had far greater significance to the emerging post-cold war world than simply reversing Iraqi aggression and restoring Kuwait. Its magnitude and significance impelled us from the outset to extend our strategic vision beyond the crisis to the kind of precedent we should lay down for the future. From an American foreign-policymaking perspective, we sought to respond in a manner which would win broad domestic support and which could be applied universally to other crises. In international terms, we tried to establish a model for the use of force. First and foremost was the principle that aggression cannot pay. If we dealt properly with Iraq, that should go a long way toward dissuading future would-be aggressors. We also believed that the U.S. should not go it alone, that a multilateral approach was better. This was, in part, a practical matter. Mounting an effective military counter to Iraq's invasion required the backing and bases of Saudi Arabia and other Arab states.

Last night I watched Chris Matthews' Hardball; the subject of the show (and this week) is essentially "What is really going on in Iraq?". The show went "live" some of the time to Bob Arnot, who gave a summary, and also went "semi-live" (which is when they pretend to be doing something live when it really isn't) for a walking tour of an Iraqi market, and interactions with the sellers.

Why is it so hard to figure out what the truth is in Iraq?

On one hand, we have the Administration telling us that everything is pretty much great, the plan is solid, the people are happy, and that the miscellaneous deaths and violence that we're seeing are a natural result of the process. Conservative pundits across the web look for every piece of evidence they can find to support this position. There is a constant focus, from those who support the Administration on the good we are doing.

On the other hand, certain parts of the press are painting a more dire picture. The international press, in particular, is pretty rough on the occupation and paints the situation as being somewhat ouf of hand. Negative press also tends to focus on the endgame; how, exactly, do the cells of terrorists and insurgents get eliminated? Is there a constant resupply of these people? The constant focus of the "counter-Administration" people is the endgame; they ignore the very real good that is happening.

So how are we to parse all of this? There exists at the moment two polarized spheres, their centers of gravity fixed on their essential positions, unable to move from them. Journalism and truth itself has been sacrificed to maintain these positions.

The Right reframes all criticism of the war as unpatriotic. The Left reframes support of the war as partisan.

Where are the neutral voices? Why, at this critical juncture in history, are there so few widely known, reputable sources of truth? Why has the truth gap become so vast?

When the truth gap opens, we look down into it...it is the abyss. If we cannot repair this and begin to agree on truth again, from first principles, we will never find a rational path forward.

A Baghdad council member appointed by the US was killed by US forces. See the Washington Post article. You're not going to win hearts and minds when you kill your appointed council members, even by accident.

Talk of a draft grows despite denials by White House.

If we reframe the Iraq situation and have the possibility of a draft, what happens to American support for this war? It disappears.

It's one thing to have a son drafted into the Army to defend the nation. It's another thing when it's a war in another country, for obscure reasons, started with less than half truths...

Our generations may yet understand Viet Nam, in fear...

Tacitus gives his current opinion on Iraq, and mentions the draft, as a terrible but possibly necessary choice.

Via Daily KOS, this chilling comment from Paul Wolfowitz:

Q: Hi, Mr. Wolfowitz. My name is Ruthy Coffman. I think I speak for many of us here when I say that your policies are deplorable. They're responsible for the deaths of innocents and the disintegration of American civil liberties. [Applause]

We are tired, Secretary Wolfowitz, of being feared and hated by the world. We are tired of watching Americans and Iraqis die, and international institutions cry out in anger against us. We are simply tired of your policies. We hate them, and we will never stop opposing them. We will never tire or falter in our search for justice. And in the name of this ideal and the ideal of freedom, we assembled a message for you that was taken away from us and that message says that the killing of innocents is not the solution, but rather the problem. Thank you. [Applause and jeers]

Wolfowitz: I have to infer from that that you would be happier if Saddam Hussein were still in power. [Applause]

***snip***

Q: I'd just like to say that people like Ruthy and myself have always opposed Saddam Hussein, especially when Saddam Hussein was being funded by the United States throughout the '80s. And -- [Applause] And after the killings of the Kurds when the United States increased aid to Iraq. We were there opposing him as well. People like us were there. We are for democracy. And I have a question.

What do you plan to do when Bush is defeated in 2004 and you will no longer have the power to push forward the project for New American Century's policy of American military and economic dominance over the people of the world? [Applause]

Wolfowitz: I don't know if it was just Freudian or you intended to say it that way, but you said you opposed Saddam Hussein especially when the United States supported him.

It seems to me that the north star of your comment is that you dislike this country and its policies. [Applause]

And it seems to me a time to have supported the United States and to push the United States harder was in 1991 when Saddam Hussein was slaughtering those innocents so viciously.

So opposing policies is Unamerican. It's good to know that. Especially when we're being told that by one of the most powerful men in the current Administration.

As always, the Onion has it straight.

I'm not going to fisk, but I'm going to take issue with a number of points you raise. Your general tone is "path of righteousness".

We are having an effect on certain terrorists, but new recruits are banging on their doors, and overall I suspect terrorism is largely unabated. I think that there just aren't all that many people in the world willing to commit suicide for their beliefs. There are some, but not that many. The rarity of events lik 9/11 is statistical evidence for this.

America's Army is NOT exterminating terrorists at the moment. They are engaged in a low-intensity battle against resistance forces, after having exhausted the regular forces invading a teeny-tiny country. Yes, there are some terrorists in the mix, and we hear about the car bombs and so forth. 99% of the conflicts with American forces are run-of-the-mill insurgents. You can't call them all terrorists. Some of them are pissed-off natives who don't want the US in their country. Some of them are Baathists. It's a mixture.

The bottom line is that most of the strength of the military is engaged in nation-building at the moment. By most reports I've read, resources have generally been shifted away from pursuit of terrorism, and towards political change in Iraq.

This is single-issue, silver-bullet foreign policy. A very great number of eggs are in a single basket. There are so many eggs in the basket that, yes, in the absence of other fiscal responsibility, there are serious threats to the economic stability of the country.

Nobody thinks the 7% growth rate is anything more than a single exceptional quarter. Most predictions go for around a 4.5% quarter next time, which is still very good, but more in line with history.

Do you not see that the debate has everything with what the US may _legitimately_ do in the world? If a nuclear bomb had detonated in NY, and was traced to Saddam Hussein, the entire world would have been behind the US in removing him. They probably would have lead the way.

This is instead a forceful war of political change...cynical and expensive. It is by no means a "war of revenge". There is no direct connection between Hussein and 9/11. Are you arguing that you believe there to be a solid connection? One that was known BEFORE the war was initiated? You are certainly willing to trade on the idea, to make your political points. Do you or do you not believe it? What evidence do you have? You have no business using it as an underpinning to debate otherwise.

So what does $300 Billion buy us? Quite a lot. Our yearly medicare budget is around $250 Billion. The interest on the national debt is around $175 Billion (due to rise dramatically). $300 Billion is a rather incredible amount of money! Of course, prior to the war, Mitch Daniels (long since fired as White House budget director) explained that the war would cost around $50 Billion.

It is simple, and deceitful, to throw round numbers like "1% of GDP". The government doesn't have anywhere near a large percentage of GDP to work with; the federal budget is around 25% of GDP, I think.

With the huge deficits Bush has created just around the corner. we will be spending, on interest, enough money to do an Iraq every year in short order.

There are so many absolutes in what you write. "Terrorists are created not by our actions, but by the failure of their societies". So our actions have no effect? I think they do. I think our actions matter greatly. I think Bush's snubbing of the UN has had an effect. His abandonment of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process has had an effect. The trashing of Kyoto has had an effect (we can argue all day long about whether it would work or not, but symbolically it was a tremendous blow to multilateralism).

I'll retract the NASCAR remark, with regards to YOU. I stand by it as far as this Administration goes. And I stand by it for most people I've met in favor of the war. Their thinking hasn't gone much past, "punch me, and get punched".

"tit-for-tat" is one of the winningest strategies for the Prisoner's Dilemma, a well-studied game theory example. I gather, in your world, that there need be no foreign policy more sophisticated than tit-for-tat. tit-for-tat is a conservative position that attempts to engender cooperation, rewarding cooperation where it exists, and punishing it where it does not. There are strategies that can beat it, but it's pretty good all around.

We aren't playing tit-for-tat, because we just took the first punch. We chose the path of non-cooperation, of unilateralism.

Finally, you state that "It is sadly common for those who are protected to resent those who do the bloody work of protecting."

Do you believe that you are somehow identifying with more firmly, and are showing more solidarity with our armed forces? I do not recall you have been on any secret missions to Iraq.

Men with guns, you can't handle the truth, and all of that. You are not on the wall with a gun, and neither am I. There are men (and women) doing that. Do you imply that those who disagree with Bush policy resent our soldiers, who protect us, and who follow orders?

Terrorists do care about US strategy and actions. Because right now, we are hunting them down. They are on the run, hiding in caves, and fearful that they will be ratted out. They are fearful that a group of US Special Forces like the ones described in GeekLethal’s first post will be knocking on the door of their hideout. The only places where terrorist attacks have happened in the wake of 9/11 are those places where we do not have troops – like Saudi Arabia, where we (hopefully temporarily) left, or Indonesia, or Israel. The most powerful military force in world history is devoted to exterminating terrorists. I think that this fact has made an impact on their thinking, and on their plans.

It will also have an effect on those who might have joined them in more salubrious times. When the uniform result of an attack on America is death and destruction not for America but for the terrorists, all but the most zealous will think twice. And even the most zealous might reconsider their means when 99% of all attempts result in abject failure. The martyr must not merely die for his faith, but he must inflict damage in the process. Continued failure will result in demoralization.

During the recent Gulf War, even Iraqi military strategy assumed the basic goodness and restraint of American forces. They hid behind civilians, knowing that we would not willingly harm civilians. The Iraqi people have witnessed that, and our efforts to rebuild their nation – not merely the damage from our brief bombing campaign, but from decades of neglect. If we are successful in remaking Iraq into a democratic nation – which will require the willing cooperation of the Iraqis, the Islamic world will notice. And the fact of a successful, free, prosperous Arab nation will put immense pressure on other authoritarian and despotic governments.

The proper question to ask is, “does America give a shit what the rest of the world thinks?” We were attacked; and we are, with the assistance of many other nations taking action we see fit to remove the threat. This is a basic right of national sovereignty. While we have taken steps to get the approval of others, we do not require it, any more than France needed UN approval to invade the Ivory Coast.

The cost of our invasion will likely exceed $300 billion dollars. That is less than one year’s expenditure on our military. It is less than three percent of our gross national product for one year. The occupation and eventual departure from Iraq will not bankrupt us, and I cannot conceive of any possible domino effect that would lead from that occupation to any kind of decline. "We didn’t spend the money on drugs for rich old people, Revolution in the streets!" This is, well, extremely unlikely at best.
The dynamism of our economy is intact – despite the recent cyclical recession, we grew at an over than 7% annual rate last quarter. The more mature and nuanced Europeans are still fighting high structural unemployment, low growth rates and stagnant technology. How this will lead to the things Ross fears eludes me.

I am reminded of an essay that PJ O’Rourke wrote, titled “Among the Euro-Weenies.”

Why yes, we do all have guns.

We're the badest-assed sons of bitches that ever jogged in Reeboks. We're three quarters grizzly bear and two-thirds car wreck and descended from a stock market crash on our mother's side. You take your Germany, France and Spain, roll them all together and it wouldn't give us room to park our cars. We're the big boys, Jack, the original, giant, economy-sized new and improved butt kickers of all time. When we snort coke in Houston, people lose their hats in Cap d'Antibes. And we've got an American Express card credit limit higher than your piss-ant metric numbers go.

You say our country's never been invaded? You're right, little buddy. Because I'd like to see the needle-dick foreigners who'd have the guts to try. We drink napalm to get our hearts started in the morning. A rape and a mugging is our way of saying "Cheerio". Hell can't hold our sock hops.

We walk taller, talk louder, spit further, f*ck longer and buy more things than you know the names of. I'd rather be a junkie in a New York City jail than king, queen and jack of all Europeans. We eat little countries like this for breakfast and shit them out before lunch.

The can of whup ass mentality does work in a world where civilization is not universal. Between the US and Canada, or in Europe and Japan, we can discuss things reasonably. There civilization is the order, literally, of the day. Elsewhere, where as you correctly note, there is no end of despots, it is a Hobbesian war of all against all. Europeans make the mistake of assuming that their polite discourse can be extended to this world, or that persuasion and kind words will change the hearts of totalitarian mini-fuehrers.

For those who are not part of civilization there is threat, coercion, and violence. In order to secure the safety of our nation, and not coincidently the safety of the the rest of the civilized world that depends on the American military for safety, we have to be prepared to open that can of whup ass. Sometimes there is no other way. Ten years of sanctions, resolutions and jabber did not end the horrific regime of Saddam Hussein. Bloody compulsion did. It is sadly common for those who are protected to resent those who do the bloody work of protecting.

Terrorists are created not by our actions, but by the failure of their societies. We did not piss them off so much that they decided to kill themselves. They fixate on our success, and figure that we must be preventing them from the riches, power and glory that by right is theirs. When we destroy those who attacked us, we are deterring others. We are demonstrating that is foolhardy in the extreme to bait us. We also demonstrate that we are magnanimous in the aftermath, and that we do not hold grudges, and that we are happy when others join us in prosperity, peace and freedom just as after WWII.

That you describe my foreign policy judgments as WWF smackdowns or NASCAR rallies is condescending not just to me but to the people who watch NASCAR and WWF. They, by and large, understand that if you’re attacked and do nothing, you will be attacked again. And nothing includes talking. Response must not be subtle. Despots are not noted for their grasp of subtlety and nuance. This level of wisdom seems entirely unattainable to much of the left. We used our force and accomplished something good – the removal of Saddam Hussein. Now we are using our unparalled wealth to rebuild that nation. The rest of the world will respect us no more or no less than it always had as a result of this war. Those who are envious or fearful will remain as they are. Those who appreciate that for all our flaws, we do stand for liberty, well they have always been our friends.

Last month I spent a few days in the company of warriors. It was like going to a different planet compared to my usual day to day existence at a liberal, snoot-ay private college. A filmmaker and I shot several training exercises conducted by special operations forces. This training was largely built around urban maneuver and combat; some exercises were held at night, others in broad daylight; some with live ammo, others with a 9mm paintball-type submunition. Many of the operators we spoke to were combat veterans and the rest are soon to be. Here's a short list of what I learned. I think it worthwhile to share these observations, particularly with Bad Guys. If you are a Bad Guy, please take these to heart and save us all some trouble in the future: 

1. These guys WILL get into your house/bunker/cave/RV/hijacked plane. You can lock the door and latch the gate if it makes you feel better, but you really needn't bother. They will blow it up, blow it off, torch or saw through it within about 15 seconds. If you give them half a chance and a pipe wide enough they will throw on some flippers, swim into your house, and come right out of your tap the next time you get a glass of water.
2. If commandos kick your door in in the middle of the night, they will not kill you if you are not holding a weapon. If you are not a Bad Guy, you might want to stop, drop, & roll like Dick Van Dyke encouraged in that old PSA. That was for fires. For this scenario, if you curl up and refrain from looking menacing you'll be OK. If you have to cry or piss yourself, try not to move too much. If you are a Bad Guy and insist on meeting Allah at that very moment, reach for your weapon. Hello, virgins!
3. Special operations people are high-energy. They do nothing slowly or half-assed. If you are a Bad Guy, you will not outrun them. You may make them tired in the process of catching you, but that will only make your immediate future exceedingly difficult.
4. Special operations people shoot better than you. While you and you cohorts were spending your days deciding whether Israel or the US was more responsible for the world's evil, they were training. Day and night, year-round: close quarter battle. Long distance sniper ranges. Heavy weapons training. Look, I KNOW you want to get your share of virgins but put it this way: I also know some want them more than others. All you have to do is not shoot at the SOF guys and you'll live. Just say, "I must live to spawn a new generation of martyrs" or some such. That'll probably fly on Al Jazeera.
5. Special operations people WANT to kill Bad Guys. ALOT of Bad Guys. Badly. They are disappointed if they are not in the fight, and will not accept failure once on the battlefield. If you are a Bad Guy, do not confuse soldiers with warriors. Soldiers exist to do specific jobs: cooks, drivers, artillerymen, military police, etc., and vary in their readiness and quality of leadership. Warriors don't share these problems. They exist to kill you. They are grouchy when they aren't. Please make a note of it.

This Washington Post Editorial is very sobering. A key quote:

"It's war because our undefeated enemies say it is and behave accordingly.

In that stubborn resistance lies a fundamental truth that seems too often to have eluded American political leaders since World War II: It's not the winner who typically decides when victory in a war has been achieved. It's the loser. "

If that is true, and it does seem so to me, then the hearts and minds of everyday Iraqis are really the key to the mission. It also places in distinctly sharper relief the Administration's predictions before the war that Americans would be welcomed as liberators, and that the population would fall over themselves to greet the incoming troops.

That has happened in small ways, but the overall situation is poor, and the attacks are accelerating. Riverbend gives us a view from one Iraqi citizen; are we winning her heart and mind? How do we convince the people shooting at the troops, recruiting "resistance fighters", that the war simply doesn't need to go on?

It will go on as long as there are people willing to fight and die against perceived occupation. When it comes to the Arab world, it seems that the supply of such people is almost limitless...and with population growth there, as fast as they can be killed (to put it bluntly), they are being replaced.

Is war and aggression truly the best path? Is there another way?

In relation to Johno's comment in a previous post:

1) You are the first person to plausibly explain how a rise in attacks might be considered a "good thing." Thanks for that. And you are right-- it IS good in a sick way, if at all.

2) In the run-up to war, we discussed the possibility that Bush wanted to whack Saddam's government as an example to others. It's not a thesis you hear very often, which is weird because it seems to me to be the single most logical of all reasons for the war. It's like we're the action hero who steps into a room of thugs who've done something bad to him and beats the shit out of the guy nearest the door-- breaks ribs, knocks out teeth, bleeding scalp, disclocated knee, swirly-- and then looks up with blood on his chin and says, "now who's next?"

1) Thank you.

2) While I have been often distracted by the minutia of why this or that reason is right, wrong, or disengenuous; at root my basic support for the war comes from that conclusion. While I think all the reasons that have been given for invading are valid to one degree or other, the core principle at work is that we needed to throw somebody against the wall after 9/11. In a sense the reasons given for the war are not justifications for an invasion of Iraq, they are merely the reasons we picked Iraq to invade.

The war on terror is a Huntingtonian clash of civilizations - on a relatively modest and restrained level. It is a clash of lifestyles. War, on one level, is merely a demonstration that our mojo is stronger than their mojo. If we are to defeat terror - it will happen because we have convinced the Islamic world that:

1. Attacking America is a supremely bad idea. That we will ruin the day of anyone who attacks us, supports those who attack us, or even looks at us funny when someone attacks us.
2. That the Islamic Fundamentalist/Baathist - Pan Arab Nationalist/Let's blow things up because we haven't got our way set of memes is a really bad way to organize your society. Because it either results in 1) above, or because it results in poverty and oppression even when your land sits atop stupendously valuable natural resources.
3. We have created at least one example that a Muslim nation can be reorganized on western lines without destroying the essential muslimness of it.

The terrorists themselves have told us how our limpwristed, ineffectual responses to previous terrorist attacks only encouraged them. It made us look weak. So, the obvious corrolary is that we must look puissant. The political wisdom that covers this situation goes back to Roman times. Be nice, until its time not to be nice. But once you change your MO, go biblical on the m-fs so that they get the idea.

War is a bad thing. But it is often better than all of the alternatives.

In a sick way, the recent shift in targets is a positive sign. It means (hopefully) that the holdover Baathist thugs and imported jihadists are finding that attacking American soldiers and Marines is a very, very, dangerous thing. One thing that the media has been less than efficient in broadcasting is that when one or two American soldiers die in an ambush, the cost to the attackers is often far higher. And many attacks are foiled without American loss of life.

It also means that the counterrevolutionaries are going to be even less popular with the general populace, which can only be a good thing from our point of view.

If we continue to hunt them down, and the people continue to help us do so, things will get better. Remember, we were in a similar situation in Germany for well over a year. Operation Werewolf was killing American and British soldiers from ambush into '46.

What I remember from the pre war build up is that the administration focused on Iraqi efforts to develop WMD. Note that the consensus of all western intelligence agencies (including the French) was that Saddam either had them, or had the capability to develop them. And, of course, he had used them in the past which is certainly an indication that the idea wasn't out of left field.

The other reasons were on the back burner, but never discounted - violation of UN resolutions (18 if I recall correctly), the brutality of the regime, and support for terror. The administration never said that Saddam was directly connected to Al Quaeda, and never said that the WMD threat was imminent.

I think the central point is that after 9/11, we had to whack somebody just to establish a deterrent. Afghanistan didn't count, as it was to small, too weak. Saddam was a perfect target, because of all the reasons that were given. If we are to eliminate terror - and the war was always cast as a war on terror in general, then we have to make large scale changes in the region that is the source of the terror that has hit us hard and that continues to be (albeit smaller) threat today.

We know that Saddam's regime supported terrorists. Groups with links to Al Quaeda are in the northeast of that country, and were before we got there. The connections to Palestinian terror were more obvious.

No one of the reasons given for the invasion of Iraq was perhaps compelling enough to justify an invasion alone. But collectively, and in light of the overall threat from terrorism, Iraq was the logical and necessary choice. The best analogy, I think, for the war on terror is the British crackdown on piracy in the 19th Century, which the United States sometimes collaborated on. Sometimes it involves direct action against pirates, sometimes against the nations that support it - even if those nations didn't help the particular pirates that attacked you. Terrorism is a threat to the west, and it is not localized in one terror group.

Strangely enough, one of my first entries is about terrorism in Iraq. I've long been against the war; it's pretty clear at this point that this Administration "fudged" (to put it gently) a lot of the information used to drive the war authorization process forward. I distinctly remember thinking, at the time that there must be some highly secret intelligence, in Bush's possession. That was the only explanation for his actions. News reports and whatever sources I could read at the time simply didn't support rushing the country into an incredibly expensive war.

If we set aside the WMD aspect, we are left with the continuous claims of the administration before the war that terrorists had taken root in Iraq, and were supported by that government. Iraq did support terror, by paying Palestinian families of martyrs, but that is not the connection that the Administration implied. They implied terror; they implied a direct connection to Al Quaeda (note the spelling of the week).

No significant evidence of such a connection has been found. And yet...over the last few days there has been a serious round of terrorism in Baghdad. There are at least 200 wounded, at least 34 dead. Virtually all of them are Iraqis. This is not, in any shape or form, "resistance" fighting. What resistance murders dozens of its own people to make a "point" against an occupier? If "collaboration" is given as a reason, it is a fiction. The vast majority of the dead are regular Iraqi civilians, not police or anyone else who could be termed a collaborator.

I find the events of the past four days to be one of the strongest indicators we have yet seen of Iraq's former government being involved in terrorism. That they have shifted to this tactic so quickly, and with deadly effects, speaks volumes about who they are, and what they were and are prepared to do.

If new elements in Iraq are responsible for these atrocities, we need to root them out. The Iraqi people don't need foreign elements blowing them up, while they're trying to rebuild a society.

The Jerusalem post has an interesting interview with Richard Perle. Particularly interesting was the story the interviewer told about Bush's visit to the WTC. Read the whole thing.

I join John Cole in wondering just how the Rumsfeld memo that was leaked to the press today is bad thing.

Assuming it's real (and yes, I'm assuming it's real), Rummy is basically asking his senior staff "how're we doing? Long way to go... how can we do better?" and getting hit in the papers with charges of "admitting we've lost." Noooo, he's asking how we can more effectively fight the terrorists. Read the memo. These kind of questions are EXACTLY the kind of issues he should be addressing.

I tend to think Rumsfeld is kind of a dickhead, (and I LOVE to see him restrain his murder-urge in front of the press), but I love that he is taking the time to address issues like "Is the Department of Defense on the right track?" and "Are we doing the best we can in Afghanistan?" I'm really glad that someone with pull is asking these difficult questions about the War On Terrah, and taking the time to solicit responses. Hopefully this will lead to improvements in our tactics and strategery.

And I agree with Cole. Leaking this kind of memo and crucifying it in the media will only lead to; fewer such memos; fewer such questions; and greater opacity from our government. All these are, say it with me, Bad Things.

Dammit.

[memo reproduced below the break.]
October 16, 2003
TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Pete Pace
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Global War on Terrorism

The questions I posed to combatant commanders this week were: Are we winning or losing the Global War on Terror? Is DoD changing fast enough to deal with the new 21st century security environment? Can a big institution change fast enough? Is the USG changing fast enough?

DoD has been organized, trained and equipped to fight big armies, navies and air forces. It is not possible to change DoD fast enough to successfully fight the global war on terror; an alternative might be to try to fashion a new institution, either within DoD or elsewhere — one that seamlessly focuses the capabilities of several departments and agencies on this key problem.

With respect to global terrorism, the record since Septermber 11th seems to be:

We are having mixed results with Al Qaida, although we have put considerable pressure on them — nonetheless, a great many remain at large.

USG has made reasonable progress in capturing or killing the top 55 Iraqis.

USG has made somewhat slower progress tracking down the Taliban — Omar, Hekmatyar, etc.

With respect to the Ansar Al-Islam, we are just getting started.

Have we fashioned the right mix of rewards, amnesty, protection and confidence in the US?

Does DoD need to think through new ways to organize, train, equip and focus to deal with the global war on terror?

Are the changes we have and are making too modest and incremental? My impression is that we have not yet made truly bold moves, although we have have made many sensible, logical moves in the right direction, but are they enough?

Today, we lack metrics to know if we are winning or losing the global war on terror. Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us?

Does the US need to fashion a broad, integrated plan to stop the next generation of terrorists? The US is putting relatively little effort into a long-range plan, but we are putting a great deal of effort into trying to stop terrorists. The cost-benefit ratio is against us! Our cost is billions against the terrorists' costs of millions.

Do we need a new organization?

How do we stop those who are financing the radical madrassa schools?

Is our current situation such that "the harder we work, the behinder we get"?

It is pretty clear that the coalition can win in Afghanistan and Iraq in one way or another, but it will be a long, hard slog.

Does CIA need a new finding?

Should we create a private foundation to entice radical madradssas to a more moderate course?

What else should we be considering?

Please be prepared to discuss this at our meeting on Saturday or Monday.

Thanks.

Roving correspondent "Geek Lethal," who claims he is too "busy" to blog these days (fie! pah! and ptui!) brought to my attention a seven-day running feature in Stars and Stripes (they're on day seven today). The magazine surveyed nearly 2000 soldiers from all services stationed in Iraq about morale, mission, and conditions, and are publishing the results with generous annotations.

I'm still working through it, and so far it's really interesting. We hear some of this stuff, but not nearly all of it, and it's instructive to hear what the soldiers in the field think. A lot of it is standard-issue bitching that soldiers have done since the mustering of the 1st Rock & Stick Corps, but some of the contrasts in conditions are very marked; for example, Air Force flyboys with a Pizza Hut, gym, and hot showers separated by barbed wire from a camp of Army reservists who live in tents and subsist on MRE's.

The big picture is better than what we hear sometimes in the press (quag!mi!re!), but neither is everything working perfectly. The Marines and Air Force have relatively high morale, while that of the reservists, again, is fairly low. Some confusion is evident in the ranks as to why they are doing what they're doing, but the overall picture is reassuringly close to what I figured it would be. Basically, in army-speak it's Situation Normal.

Highlights: Day 1 covers methodology and overview; Day 4 discusses the new role the reserves play in military strategy; and day 5 covers in part the need for flexibility in the face of shifting goals.

Overall, it's a fascinating (albeit long) read. Go look: it's worth your time.

In the interest of fairness and balance, I offer this piece by way of contrast to the Iraq progress report I pointed to last week. The story, which comes from the UK Independent, claims that US soldiers bulldozed the farms of Iraqis who refused to aid in ferreting out resistance fighters.

Of course, it's possible that this is merely hearsay (Lord, I hope so), which only means it's still nearly as credible as what you hear on the news.

The bottom line is, from the conservative press, I hear how great things are in Iraq. From the mainstream press, I hear how it's a quagmire. From the leftist press, I hear it's armageddon. All I want is a reason to hold out hope that it will all turn out well. The "right" seems consumed with wishing disaster on the Vast Left-Wing Conspiracy, and the "left" seems consumed with wishing disaster on the US, and by extension, Iraq. You all believe what you want. I'm going to go watch baseball.

[Hossein Khomeini:] "Now we have had 25 years of a failed Islamic revolution in Iran, and the people do not want an Islamic regime anymore."

[Christopher Hitchens:] It's not strictly necessary to speak to Hossein Khomeini to appreciate the latter point: Every visitor to Iran confirms it, and a large majority of the Iranians themselves have voted for anti-theocratic candidates. The entrenched and reactionary regime can negate these results up to a certain point; the only question is how long can they do so? Young Khomeini is convinced that the coming upheaval will depend principally on those who once supported his grandfather and have now become disillusioned. I asked him what he would like to see happen, and his reply this time was very terse and did not require any Quranic scriptural authority or explication. The best outcome, he thought, would be a very swift and immediate American invasion of Iran.

It hurt me somewhat to have to tell him that there was scant chance of deliverance coming by this means. He took the news pretty stoically (and I hardly think I was telling him anything he did not know). But I was thinking, wow, this is what happens if you live long enough. You'll hear the ayatollah's grandson saying, not even "Send in the Marines" but "Bring in the 82nd Airborne." I think it was the matter-of-factness of the reply that impressed me the most: He spoke as if talking of the obvious and the uncontroversial.

That reminded me to ask him what he thought of the mullahs' nuclear program. He calmly said that there was no physical force that was stronger than his faith, and thus there was no need for any country to arm itself in this way. No serious or principled Shiite had any fear of his belief being destroyed by any kind of violence. It was not a matter for the state, and the state and religion (he reiterated) ought to be separated—for both their sakes.

From a Christopher Hitchens article in Slate. We live in strange days indeed.

Reuters has a mildly strange article on recent comments from Egyptian President Mubarek. That Mubarek would consider Arafat getting the boot a terrorist act is perhaps no surprise. I have to say, though, showing him the door is hardly the moral equivalent of this. The exact nature of the "grave consequences" Mubarak predicted for Israel if they went ahead and removed the Palestinian leader are unclear.

What I found odd was this bit:

Mubarak's comments came in the text of an interview published by the official Middle East News Agency (MENA) to mark the 30th anniversary of the 1973 October War, when Egypt and Syria launched a surprise assault to regain territories lost to Israel in the 1967 Middle East War.

Israel's security cabinet decided in principle last month to "remove" Arafat after declaring him responsible for Islamic militant attacks on Israelis.

What I thought was weird - is it me, or is the '73 Arab-Israeli war generally referred to as the Yom Kippur War? I've heard it referred to as the '73 War, the fourth Arab-Israeli War, but never as the October War. And why was MENA celebrating the thirtieth anniversary of a defeat that led to the peace accords?