Yesterday President Bush announced a plan to "explore space and extend a human presence across our solar system." My initial reaction to the speech was one of general disappointment, with a few small slivers of hope. Disappointment because the plan sounds like many previous plans that have amounted to little more than wasted money and wasted opportunity. Disappointment because the timeframes are very long, and the plan has little focus.
Slivers of hope, because at least it is now the established policy of the United States to extend a human presence across the solar system, and more importantly the plan does not make any statements that threaten to extinguish the small candle of private space endeavors. Of course, it does not incorporate them, which is another disappointment. As I look around the blogosphere, intelligent commentators have expressed similar sentiments. Rand Sindberg, Joe Katzman over at Winds of Change, and Jay Manifold of A Voyage to Arcturus. For a good discussion of the rationales behind space exploration, see Laughing Wolf's take.
There are several problems with the plan the President outlined. First, if the Shuttle is going to be retired by 2010, but the new Crew Exploration Vehicle will not be available until 2014 at the earliest; what are we going to use in the intervening four plus years? Second, this CEV is intended to transport crew from the surface of the Earth to Low Earth Orbit, and from LEO to the lunar surface. It also might be intended as a crew habitat on the moon and part of a Mars mission as well. It is unlikely in the extreme that a vehicle can be designed that will satisfy all of these requirements; and even if one is designed, it will likely have fatal flaws like those of the shuttle. Third, there is no mention of developing a heavy lift vehicle, which would be necessary for most workable concepts for lunar development or trips to Mars. Fourth, the design timeframe for a Mars mission would stretch over six presidential elections and 13 congressional elections. I don't see how any program can maintain focus over this long a period in the face of that much politics. It seems inevitable that it will drift off into waste and endless redesign as many other programs have in the past.
There are other objections to the mission assumptions. Why are we planning a return to robotic exploration of the Moon? We have after all already walked on the moon, and there are currently orbiters circling the moon that should be capable of mapping out landing sites. Why is a human return to the moon placed more than a decade in the future? We managed to get to the moon in less than a decade, starting from scratch over forty years ago. I should think that nearly half a century of progress in computers, materials, engineering, and science along with the knowledge of how we did it the first time should reduce that timeline significantly. (Granted, cost certainly is an object this time around. Nevertheless....) Why are the Moon and Mars named as the only destinations? A mission to a Near Earth Asteroid would provide a shorter, but still long duration mission; enabling us to test our ability to survive away from Earth without worrying about the problems of landing on a planet. Further, such a mission would have the added benefit of providing some really good science and experience that will certainly come in handy as we move out into the solar system.
With these thoughts in mind, how should we go about getting to Mars?
First, we need to have a clear idea of what it takes to get to Mars: A Mars mission will necessarily be a long one, in all likelihood well over a year on the inside. There is no possibility for rescue in the event of a mishap, which puts additional pressure on planners. It takes a significant amount of energy to get there, slow to enter Mars orbit, and then land. New technologies will have to be developed to allow us to live on and explore the hostile environment of Mars' surface. And finally, we need to be able to get into Earth orbit in a safe, reliable and relatively cheap manner, or else all other considerations are moot. Most of the cost of the Bush Sr. Mars plan in the early nineties was driven by the astronomical cost per pound to orbit. Reduce that price, and things begin to be possible. So, we have in front of us several tasks that need to be addressed:
- Design, build and test effective, safe and cheaper means of getting to LEO.
- Learn how to survive without outside inputs of supplies for several years in space
- Design, build and test an interplanetary spaceship capable of delta-v on the order of a couple km/s.
- Design build and test the equipment the explorers would use on the Martian surface.
Each of these programs could be started simultaneously, and could run concurrently. As we will see, the technologies developed in these programs can be tested separately, and finally combined in a full-scale Mars mission.
Earth to Orbit The first and most crucial component of any plan to get to Mars, or indeed to anywhere beyond the surface of the Earth is to develop more effective ways to get to Earth orbit. The major flaw of the space shuttle is that it is an attempt to meet too many mission goals simultaneously. We would be better served by a variety of vehicles; each specialized to meet one mission profile. In the near term, there are three basic mission profiles:
- Crew transport
- Satellite and regular resupply missions to the space station
- Heavy lift
There is little need and great expense in launching the 150,000lb. Shuttle orbiter merely to get seven humans into orbit. Our first goal should be the rapid design and testing of a new crew vehicle. There is a significant body of research already in existence, we should merely choose the most cost effective means of getting people into (and back from) orbit. The most likely candidate, at least in the short term, would be to design something along the lines of the Orbital Space Plane that NASA was talking about last fall. Launched on a reliable, disposable, multistage rocket such as the Atlas or Delta, this vehicle could carry several astronauts into orbit, and reenter the atmosphere much as the shuttle does. Advances in materials technology should make this vehicle reusable - at least for several missions. The OSP would be much smaller and much simpler than the Shuttle orbiter, and as a result should be much cheaper. An OSP docked to the space station could also serve as a emergency crew return vehicle as well. A vehicle as simple as this should take no more than a year to develop, given even remotely adequate program management. This is not groundbreaking technology, and should require mostly off the shelf components. If we developed this fast enough, there should be no need to reactivate the shuttle fleet. Our primary goal should be a first launch of an OSP by early 2005.
Initially, several of these vehicles could serve our needs to get astronauts into orbit. As our space endeavors grow, more could be constructed. Once launched, the base version would be capable of supporting its crew for several days - providing air, water, food and shelter. It would have a retro rocket that would allow the vehicle to de-orbit and come back to earth. While we are using the OSP, more advanced crew vehicles could be designed to further reduce costs and increase efficiency. But it would not require us to go without a crewed vehicle for any length of time, and while allowing us to retire the unsafe and inefficient space shuttle.
With a little forethought, the design could be made more useful. If allowances are made for wingless versions, and for the attachment of service modules, the same vehicle could serve as a template for a whole line of space vehicles, easily adapted for different roles. A wingless (and lighter) version could be lofted into orbit, mated to a modular service module. The service module would contain a more powerful rocket, fuel tanks and additional life support capability. This vehicle could then be used within Earth orbit as a utility vehicle, taxi or tugboat. If the service module included a small robotic arm, the OSP would become a construction vehicle. Further, the service module would turn the OSP into an Earth-Moon shuttle. Without the need to reenter the earth's atmosphere, or to land on the Moon, the OSP could transfer crew and small cargoes between Earth and lunar orbit. Thus, one vehicle would serve many needs without the massive over-design we see in the shuttle.
For satellite launch and regular resupply missions, we should emulate the Russians and use disposable rockets. Our Delta and Atlas rockets are reliable and not too expensive, at least in the short run. Without the space shuttle, more launches would go to these platforms, and prices should come down somewhat through economies of scale. As a enhancement to this general scheme, any restrictions on American companies using these rockets for private launches should be lifted. Developing a commercial launch industry, even with "primitive" disposable rocket technology, is only to the good. As with the crewed vehicles, we can continue design efforts for more advanced vehicles while using what we have.
The final mission profile is much easier to achieve than many would think. For decades now, ideas have been floating around for Shuttle Derived Vehicles. (Go here for a nice overview.) Essentially every time we launch the shuttle, we are using a heavy lift launcher. The shuttle orbiter weighs over 150,000lbs, and all of that is technically payload. Add in the nearly 50,000lbs of payload that the orbiter carries, that runs to quite a load. If we eliminate the orbiter, nearly all of that becomes useful payload.
Of the several schemes that have been proposed, the Shuttle-C idea is closest to reality. This system essentially replaces the orbiter with a cargo pod. The back of the cargo pod is identical with the orbiter's "Boat-Tail" and contains standard shuttle engines. In front of this is a thin, lightweight shell that would protect the cargo during launch. The payload capacity of the "C" is two to three times larger than with a standard orbiter, and costs would certainly be no more than a standard shuttle launch, as we avoid the expensive refurbishment that the orbiter goes through after every launch. There is no reason that I am aware of that we could begin launching Shuttle-C's in less than a year or two, as absolutely no new technology is required, and the redesign involves only an unscrewed cargo shell.
Once we have the Shuttle-C operational, we drop the per pound cost to orbit by at least a factor of three, and make possible launches we could not have attempted previously due to payload constraints. We could expand the space station if necessary, and launch the components for lunar bases and interplanetary missions. And again, while we are using the Shuttle-C, we can be designing more efficient follow-ons. The Shuttle-B would have a similar configuration, but would use cheaper engines designed for disposable rockets. More involved redesigns could use more Solid Rocket Boosters for even greater payload, or a wide variety of other variations.
(And of course, with some forethought, some of these components can be made more useful. The Shuttle-C cargo pod could conceivably become new pressurized living space, needing only retrofitting with furnishings. The perfectly functional shuttle main engines could be reused. The External Tanks could be brought into orbit and used as pressure space or fuel depots. Endless possibilities.)
The amazing thing is that with a little effort, and a willingness to actually build and test rather conduct endless studies; most of this hardware could be operational within a year or two, and none of it requires any new technology whatsoever. Once we have a new transportation infrastructure, we can go back and come up with better vehicles - or better yet, request bids for new vehicles from private industry rather than design them within NASA. These vehicles would allow us to almost immediately expand our presence in Earth orbit, and begin to gain the skills we will soon need further out. They would allow us to launch the hardware that we will use to return to the moon in style, rather than via robotic proxy. There's no reason we can't have a moon base by the end of the decade. I'll tackle the next three tasks in the next couple posts.